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NOTE
AGEISM, THE ADEA, AND THE AGELESS
DEBATE OVER STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION
BRETT E. COOPER*
INTRODUCTION
During recent years, the Supreme Court has increasingly
focused on the enigma of federalism.' One aspect of this debate
is the diminution of state citizens' rights to seek redress against
states, resulting from increasingly stringent judicial standards.2
* J.D. Candidate, June 2001, St. John's University School of Law; B.S.M.E,
M.S.C.E., Tufts University.
1 "Most observers agree that the leading contribution of the Rehnquist court to
constitutional jurisprudence has been a series of decisions reining in federal
intrusion on state authority." Theodore B. Olson, Aaaand They're Offi The Justices
Go to Work, WALL ST. J., Oct. 4, 1999, at A43; see also Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706,
711 (1999) (holding that Maine could not be sued by probation officers seeking
redress in federal or state court); Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.
v. College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 666, 690 (1999) (stating that Congress exceeded its
constitutional authority when it authorized private suits against the states for
patent infringement and Lanham Act violations); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S.
898, 935 (1997) ("Congress cannot compel the States to enact or enforce a federal
regulatory program."); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992)
(maintaining that Congress cannot commandeer a state's legislative or executive
branches to administer or enact federal regulations).
2 See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 55 (1996) (overruling
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989) and announcing a stringent two-
part test to be utilized when analyzing legislation that abrogates Eleventh
Amendment sovereign immunity); see also City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507,
520 (1997) (narrowing the Seminole Tribe two-part test by requiring "congruence
and proportionality" between Fourteenth Amendment violations by the states and
Congress's chosen remedy). The judicial standards have been debated over the
years. In earlier years, "[J]ustices William J. Brennan, Thurgood Marshall, Harry
A. Blackmun and John Paul Stevens argued against the expansion of state
sovereign immunity-mostly in dissent-and sought an 11th [sic] Amendment
doctrine more closely limited to the text itself." Bernard James, The States' Rights
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The debate on states' sovereign immunity is not new to the
United States' political landscape. In fact, it has been ongoing
since the framing of the Constitution.3 Indeed, shortly after the
ratification of the Constitution, the states were given immunity
from suit under the Eleventh Amendment. 4 Over the years, the
states both waived5 their immunity as to certain matters, and
had some of their immunity withdrawn by Congress. 6 This Note
Cases Provoke Fire, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 16, 1999, at B10 (footnote omitted). The five
member majority (Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy) of the
current Term seem likely to allow Congress to abrogate immunity. See id.
3 Alexander Hamilton emphasized the importance of immunity of the sovereign
from suit by its citizens in The Federalist Number 81:
It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of
an individual without its consent.... ITihe exemption, as one of the
attributes of sovereignty, is now enjoyed by the government of every State
in the Union. Unless, therefore, there is a surrender of this immunity in
the plan of the convention, it will remain with the States, and the danger
intimated must be merely ideal.
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 661 n.9 (1974) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 81,
at 487-88 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)). As evidenced by the
enactment of the Eleventh Amendment, the states wished to be immune from suit.
See U.S. CONST. amend. XL "The Constitution never would have been ratified if the
States and their courts were to be stripped of their sovereign authority except as
expressly provided by the Constitution itself." Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon,
473 U.S. 234, 239 n.2 (1984); see also Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 71 (reviewing the
intentions of the framers of the Constitution with regard to state sovereign
immunity); Laurie A. McCann, The ADEA and the Eleventh Amendment, 2
EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMPLOYMENT POLY J. 241, 242 (1998) (stating that the Supreme
Court's decisions in Seminole Tribe and City of Boerne, provide further balance to
the federal and state distribution of powers, the states cannot avoid liability in
federal court).
4 The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution states "[tihe
Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in
law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against any one of the United States by
Citizens of another State." U.S. CONST. amend. XL The Supreme Court has read
this Amendment to grant states immunity from suit unless there has been an
express consent to suit or a valid abrogation of the state's immunity by Congress.
See Atascadero State Hosp., 473 U.S. at 238. In addition, the Eleventh Amendment
has been interpreted to preclude suits brought by a citizen against his own state.
See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15 (1890).
5 A waiver by a state to accept liability in federal court is beyond the
protections of the Eleventh Amendment. See Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447
(1883). Immunity from suit belonging to a state "is a personal privilege which it may
waive at pleasure." See id.; see also Hans, 134 U.S. at 17 (stating that
"[u]ndoubtedly a State may be sued by its own consent"). This Note does not focus
on whether there are states that have waived their sovereign immunity with regard
to age discrimination. To the extent that many states have not waived such
immunity, the circuit cases included herein discuss abrogation of sovereign
immunity under the Enabling Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
6 Under the earlier ruling of Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989),
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will address the abrogation of states' immunity by Congress as
enacted in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA),7
and the subsequent Supreme Court holding that found this
abrogation unconstitutional.8 Due to a lack of consensus among
the circuit courts of appeal concerning whether the ADEA was a
proper abrogation of the states' sovereign immunity the Court
granted certiorari to hear Kimel v. State of Florida Board Of
Regents.9 Subsequently, the Supreme Court held that the ADEA
was unenforceable against a state. °
In deciding Kimel, the Supreme Court had to determine
which of the circuit court decisions concerning the ADEA were
properly decided." The Court ultimately employed judicial
restraint and resolved the Kimel case without expressly creating
a new, more stringent, constitutional precedent. 12 Arguably, the
Kimel decision, although based on existing case law, continues
the Court's campaign towards greater federalism. The negative
effect on state employees seeking redress under the ADEA,
however, is an unfortunate result of the Court's most recent
ruling. The Court will likely continue to find the abrogation
standard is not met by a variety of statutes.
the states lost a tremendous amount of Eleventh Amendment immunity. In that
case, the Supreme Court held that sovereign immunity could be abrogated by
legislation passed pursuant to Article I powers, notably the Commerce Clause. See
id. The Supreme Court's holding in Seminole Tribe, however, expressly overruled its
earlier ruling in Union Gas. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 66 (finding that "Ithe
[Union Gas] decision has.., been of questionable precedential value, largely
because a majority of the Court expressly disagreed with the rationale of the
plurality"). The states regained some of their previously lost Eleventh Amendment
immunity when the Court overruled Union Gas and held that Congress could only
abrogate the states' immunity from suit under section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See id at 59.
7 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-35 (1994).
8 See Kimel v. Florida Ed. of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631, 650 (2000).
9 See Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 139 F.3d 1426 (11th Cir. 1998), cert.
granted, 119 S. Ct. 901 (1999).
10 See Kimel, 120 S. Ct. at 650.
11 See id. at 639.
12 The Court simply held that the ADEA did not fulfill the Seminole Tribe test
because of a lack of clear language. See Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 77
F.3d 690, 696 (3d Cir. 1996) ("The statutory language of the ADEA simply does not
evince an unmistakably clear intention to abrogate."); Humenansky v. Regents of
the Univ. of Minn., 152 F.3d 822, 825 (8th Cir. 1998) (stating that the ADEA's text
does not reflect an unmistakably clear intent to abrogate), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct.
930 (2000). The decision that found the ADEA did not flfill the Seminole Tribe test
is less controversial because it did not set forth any new standards for Congress to
follow, and would not have as many implications on other statutory schemes.
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One difficulty the Court had in evaluating the ADEA was
that a number of equally plausible arguments have been made
both to uphold and to strike down the ADEA's abrogation of
state immunity.13 Notwithstanding these arguments, the Court
chose to decide the Kimel case without explicitly setting any new
standards. The Kimel case presented the Court with an
opportunity to once again take a stance on federalism. The
Court did so implicitly, by holding the ADEA did not fulfill the
current standard for abrogation under Seminole Tribe v.
Florida.'4
In deciding Kimel, the Court decided not to expressly change
the standards set by the judiciary for abrogating sovereign
immunity under the Fourteenth Amendment, and used ordinary
methods of statutory interpretation, such as the plain meaning
rule.15 Applying the plain meaning rule to the ADEA presented
the Court with some difficulty due to the persuasiveness of the
arguments made by the circuit courts in defense of varying
interpretations. 6 Yet the Court did not stray from the plain
13 See infra notes 73-76, 120-23 and accompanying text.
14 517 U.S. 44 (1996). The Court stated that in order to determine whether
Congress has abrogated the states' immunity, a court must ask two questions: first,
whether Congress has " 'unequivocally expresse[d] [sic] its intent to abrogate the
immunity,'" and second, whether Congress has acted" 'pursuant to a valid exercise
of power.'" Id. at 55 (citing Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985)). The Court
recently sidestepped the federalism issue in deciding a case concerning the
abrogation of sovereign immunity under the Americans with Disabilities Act. See
Olmstead v. L.C., 119 S. Ct. 2176, 2181 (1999) (stating that since the briefs
presented to the Court did not present this issue, even though the issue was
presented to the lower courts, it would not decide the matter). In the same Term,
the Court did posit, however, that "the sovereign immunity of the States neither
derives from nor is limited by the terms of the Eleventh Amendment... [but] is a
findamental aspect of the sovereignty which [they] enjoyed before the ratification of
the Constitution, and which they retain today." Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240,
2246-47 (1999).
15 The definition of the plain meaning rule is "[a] rule that if a writing, or
provision in a writing, appears to be unambiguous on its face, its meaning must be
determined from the writing itself without resort to any extrinsic evidence."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1170 (7th ed. 1999). This principle is best described by
Justice Day: "Statutory words are uniformly presumed, unless the contrary appears,
to be used in their ordinary and usual sense, and with the meaning commonly
attributed to them." Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485-86 (1917).
16 The Eighth Circuit summed up two different interpretations in the
Humenansky decision.
If we look only at § 626(c), the 1974 ADEA amendments are just like the
1966 FLSA amendments at issue in Employees-Congress now covered
public employers but did not expressly allow them to be sued in federal
court. On that basis, we would conclude no intent to abrogate, following
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meaning rule.17 Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority,
found that Congress had not acted within the power of Section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment.' 8 This Note argues, however,
that a true facial reading should have brought down a contrary
decision.' 9
This Note discusses the development of Eleventh
Amendment abrogation under the Enabling Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Part I explores the Seminole Tribe
decision and some other notable decisions that modified its
holding.20 Part II delineates the reasoning of four circuit courts
of appeals 21 and their rationale for finding either that the ADEA
the reasoning in Employees as reinforced by the Court's later decisions in
Atascadero and Dellmuth. On the other hand, if we look at the ADEA's
enforcement scheme from the perspective of its cross-reference to the
FLSA, Congress cured the abrogation deficiency found in Employees by
amending § 216(b) at the same time § 630(b)(2) was amended to include
States and other public employers.
Humenansky, 152 F.3d at 825.
17 Many commentators have coined the phrase "Scalian interpretation" to refer
to the Court's reluctance to find any meaning within a statute other than the plain
meaning of the words. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Textualism, The Unknown
Ideal?, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1509, 1512 (1998). Such literal interpretation can lead to
obscure results, as was true in a case involving the employment status of a priest.
In making its determination, the Supreme Court had to read the statute in
conjunction with other materials to find that a priest was not covered by the statute.
See Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 458, 472 (1892) (holding that a
priest was not intended to be covered by the statute that criminalized employment
of an "alien" to "perform labor or service of any kind").
Is See Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631, 650 (2000) ("In light of
the indiscriminate scope of the Act's substantive requirements, and the lack of
evidence of widespread and unconstitutional age discrimination by the States, we
hold that the ADEA is not a valid exercise of Congress's power under § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment.").
19 A reading of the ADEA, including enacted amendments, brings a strictly
"Scalian interpreter" to the conclusion that the ADEA fulfills the requirements for
validly abrogating state immunity as set forth in Seminole Tribe. See Coger v. Board
of Regents, 154 F.3d 296, 301 (6th Cir. 1998) (finding that the inclusion of the word
"employer" in the 1974 amendment to the ADEA was sufficiently clear to fulfill the
Seminole Tribe standard).
20 Seminole Tribe restated the two-prong test used to determine if a statute is
proper legislation under the Fourteenth Amendment to validly abrogate sovereign
immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S.
44, 54-55 (1996). The Court also narrowed the constitutional basis permissible for
abrogation of sovereign immunity to the Enabling Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See id.
21 See Migneault v. Peck, 158 F.3d 1131 (10th Cir. 1998); Coger, 154 F.3d 296;
Kimel v. State of Florida Bd. of Regents, 139 F.3d 1426 (11th Cir. 1998), cert.
granted, 119 S. Ct. 901 (1999); Humenansky, 152 F.3d 822.
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properly abrogated state immunity or that it did not.22 In this
section, opinions accompanying the Kimel decision will be
explored.23 The analysis presented throughout this Note serves
cumulatively to support the position that the ADEA should be
valid legislation under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.24 Finally, Part III attempts to illuminate the path
down which recent Supreme Court decisions seem to be leading.
Part IV discusses the approach that the Court took in deciding
the Kimel case.25 The open issue, likely to be vigorously debated,
is whether the Kimel case has "raised the bar" for determining
whether legislation validly abrogates state immunity. Future
decisions concerning the validity of other statutes that abrogate
state immunity will look to Kimel for guidance. The Court's
decision is likely to be interpreted by many circuit courts in
upcoming decisions.26
I. UNEQUIVOCAL ABROGATION OF ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
IMMUNITY
The Eleventh Amendment provides the states with
immunity from suits brought by citizens in federal courts based
on either diversity jurisdiction or federal law.2 7 This immunity,
however, is not absolute because Congress may legislate to
abrogate the Eleventh Amendment.28 Eleventh Amendment
22 The four cases are grouped into two sets. The first set of cases, Migneault
and Coger, held that the ADEA properly abrogated sovereign immunity. The second
set of cases, Kimel and Humenansky, held that the ADEA did not properly abrogate
state immunity.
23 Although this discussion is contained within the section that deals with cases
holding that the ADEA does not validly abrogate state immunity, it was placed in
proximity to the discussion of the majority holding of the same decision.
2 Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment states: "[tihe Congress shall have
power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." See U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV § 5.
2 See infra notes 222-39 and accompanying text.
26 Indeed, as early as March 2000, the case had been cited five times by the
circuit courts of appeal. See Migneault v. Peck, No. 97-2099, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS
2811 (10th Cir. Feb. 25, 2000); Kilcullen v. New York State DOL, No. 99-7208, 2000
U.S. App. LEXIS 2714 (2d Cir. Feb. 24, 2000); Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, No. 93-
2881, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 2490 (5th Cir. Feb. 18, 2000); McDevitt v. Oregon State
Hosp., No. 98-35792, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 2381 (9th Cir. Feb. 15, 2000); Shepler v.
Northwest Ohio Developmental Ctr., No. 99-3079, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 1954 (6th
Cir. Feb. 9, 2000).
27 See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996); see also supra note 4
and accompanying text.
28 See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 56.
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immunity may be abrogated by Congress provided it enacts
legislation that: (1) provides a cause of action against the states
that is remedial in nature, and (2) is for the purpose of enforcing
the Fourteenth Amendment. Such legislation, which results in
heightened liability for the states, has historically been
disfavored.29 In Seminole Tribe, the Supreme Court established
a two-part test to be fulfilled in order for legislation to
successfully abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity.30 A court
must determine: (1) whether Congress has unequivocally
expressed its intent to abrogate the states' immunity; and (2)
whether Congress has acted pursuant to a valid exercise of
power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 31
The first prong of the test aims to determine whether
Congress is "making its intention unmistakably clear in the
language of the statute."3 2 In Seminole Tribe, the Court found
that the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA)3 3 satisfied this
prong due to the sheer number of references to the "state" in the
remedial scheme of the legislation.34 In Dellmuth v. Muth 5,
however, the Court specifically addressed the use of extrinsic
legislative materials to determine congressional intent
concerning the abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity.36
The Court reaffirmed the test set out in Atascadero State
Hospital v. Scanlon,37 stating that it would "conclude Congress
intended to abrogate sovereign immunity only if its intention is
'unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.' "38 The Court
held that "recourse to legislative history will be futile, because by
definition the rule of Atascadero [requiring unmistakably clear
language in the statute] will not be met."3 9 Despite this position,
29 See id.
30 See id. at 55 (quoting Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985)).
31 See id. (citing Green, 474 U.S. at 68).
32 See id. at 56 (quoting Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 228 (1988)).
33 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-21 (1994).
34 See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 57.
35 491 U.S. 223, 230 (1988).
36 See id. at 230. In Dellmuth, the Court disagreed with the Third Circuit's
conclusion that the text and legislative history of the Education of the Handicapped
Act indicated Congress's intent to abrogate the immunity of the states. The Court
failed to find Congress's intent unmistakably clear from the language of the statute
and this foreclosed any inquiry into the legislative history. See id.
37 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
38 Dellmuth, 491 U.S. at 230 (quotingAtascadero State Hosp., 473 U.S. at 242).
39 See id.
20001
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it seems some redeemable authority can be found in the
legislative history if such history is extremely clear and
persuasive concerning intent.
Many of the circuit courts addressed the need to interpret
legislative materials and the 1974 Amendments to the ADEA.40
These amendments provide the requisite textual intent to
abrogate the states' immunity.41  The clarity of the 1974
Amendments in showing the intent of Congress is brought into
even sharper focus by the accompanying legislative materials.42
Once there has been a satisfactory showing of congressional
intent to abrogate states' immunity, the second prong of the
Seminole Tribe test requires that the legislation be passed
"'pursuant to a valid exercise of power.' 43 The Court held that
legislation passed under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment 44 is a valid exercise of power.45 The Court, however,
ruled that legislation passed under the Commerce Clause could
not validly abrogate the states' immunity, thus overruling
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co. 46 Interestingly, the Seminole
40 See Migneault v. Peck, 158 F.3d 1131 (10th Cir. 1998); Coger v. Board of
Regents, 154 F.3d 296 (6th Cir. 1998); Keeton v. University of Nev. Sys., 150 F.3d
1055 (9th Cir. 1998); Goshtasby v. Board of Trustees, 141 F.3d 761 (7th Cir. 1998).
41 See 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1994) ("The term 'employer' means a... State or
political subdivision of a State and any agency or instrumentality of a State or a
political subdivision of a State.").
42 See 118 CONG. REC. 7745, 7746 (1972).
43 Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 58 (1996) (quoting Green v. Mansour,
474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985)).
44 Indubitably, the core of the Fourteenth Amendment is comprised of the Due
Process and the Equal Protection Clauses. "[N]or shall any state deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process; nor deny any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Section
5 reads "Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. Thus, section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment has been described as a "positive grant of legislative
power'" to Congress. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 517 (1997) (quoting
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966)). This power extends only to
enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment and as such has been characterized as
remedial. See id. at 519 (citing South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 326
(1966)). Therefore, when Congress acts pursuant to its power in section 5, a critical
inquiry to be made is whether the legislation is remedial, i.e., preventing and
correcting unconstitutional behavior, or excessive such that it creates a substantive
change in constitutional rights. See id.
45 See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59.
46 491 U.S. 1 (1989) (holding that the Commerce Clause was a proper basis for
abrogating state immunity). See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 66; see also supra note
6.
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Tribe case did not specifically state that a statute must textually
reference Section 5 when abrogating sovereign immunity. The
lack of guidance on this matter by the Seminole Tribe Court
necessarily suggests that Congress is not required to cite Section
5 in order to effectuate the abrogation of states' immunity.47
In EEOC v. Wyoming,48 the Court held that the ADEA was a
valid exercise of congressional power under the Commerce
Clause, but did not determine whether it was also a valid
exercise of congressional power under Section 5.49 Moreover, the
circuit courts which have found abrogation to exist have stated
that the Supreme Court's earlier holding in Pennhurst State
School and Hospital v. Halderman5° does not require a recital of
the words "Section 5" in order for the legislation to be a valid
exercise of enforcement power under the Fourteenth
Amendment.51 This second issue is critical to an analysis of the
ADEA because the statute does not specifically mention the
Fourteenth Amendment.52
In order to understand the current state of the law, it is
helpful to examine the factual background of the Seminole Tribe
case. In a fractured opinion, the Court held that the IGRA did
not abrogate the state's immunity from a suit brought by the
Seminole Indians against the state for failure to negotiate in
good faith as required by federal law.5 3 Chief Justice Rehnquist,
writing for the majority, applied the two-part test first
47 Throughout the years, the Supreme Court has resolutely adhered to the
notion that "the constitutionality of action taken by Congress does not depend on
the recitals of power which it undertakes to exercise." Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co.,
333 U.S. 138, 144 (1948); see also EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 243-44 n.18
(1983) ("That does not mean... that Congress need anywhere recite the words
'section 5' or 'Fourteenth Amendment' or 'equal protection.' "). This principle
remains undisturbed by the decision in Seminole Tribe.
48 460 U.S. 226 (1983).
49 See id. at 243.
50 451 U.S. 1, 15-17 (1981).
51 See Wyoming, 460 U.S. at 243-44 n.18; see, e.g, Goshtasby v. Board of
Trustees, 141 F.3d 761, 768 (7th Cir. 1998) ("Despite the fact that Pennhurst...
warned us to proceed cautiously before determining Congress's intent.., the rule
remains that Congress need not use magic words to exercise its enforcement power
under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
52 See generally 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994).
53 See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 75-76 (1996) (finding that the
state's immunity was not abrogated under section 2710(d) of the Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act (IGRA), 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-21 (1994)).
2000o1
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established by Green v. Mansour54 and found that the IGRA
failed the second prong.
Additionally, the Seminole Tribe Court compared the Indian
Commerce Clause and the Interstate Commerce Clause and
overruled Pennsylvania v. Union Gas.55 The Court held that it
would not sustain abrogation of state immunity if the legislation
was passed pursuant to the Commerce Clause.56  Justice
Stevens, writing for the dissent, argued that if the holding in
Seminole Tribe were taken to its logical conclusion, a vast array
of federal actions would now be barred.57 Justice Stevens wrote
that states would be immune from being sued for violations of
federal copyright, bankruptcy, and antitrust laws.58 Clearly, this
seems to be beyond the scope of state sovereign immunity
envisioned by the founding fathers or the proponents of the
Eleventh Amendment.
In City of Boerne v. Flores,59 the Supreme Court held that
the power to legislate under Section 5 is not limitless and must
be for the purpose of enforcing the other provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment.60 This principle was followed in Coger
v. Board of Regents of State of Tennessee,61 where the Court
acknowledged that Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment was
5 474 U.S. 64 (1985). In Mansour, the Court pronounced: "States may not be
sued in federal court unless they consent to it in unequivocal terms or unless
Congress, pursuant to a valid exercise of power, unequivocally expresses its intent
to abrogate the immunity." Id. at 68 (citing Halderman, 465 U.S. at 99).
55 See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 60-66 (overruling the reasoning in
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989), that without the power to
abrogate state immunity under the Commerce Clause, the power to regulate
interstate commerce would be incomplete).
56 See id. at 73 ("Article I cannot be used to circumvent the constitutional
limitations placed upon federal jurisdiction.").
57 See id. at 77-78 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
58 See id.
59 521 U.S. 507 (1999).
60 The Court noted that
[wihile the line between measures that remedy or prevent unconstitutional
actions and measures that make a substantive change in the governing
law is not easy to discern, and Congress must have wide latitude in
determining where it lies, the distinction exists and must be observed.
There must be a congruence and proportionality between the injury to be
prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end. Lacking such a
connection, legislation may become substantive in operation and effect.
History and our case law support drawing the distinction, one apparent
from the text of the Amendment.
Id. at 519-20.
61 154 F.3d 296 (6th Cir. 1998).
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not specifically referred to in the text of the legislation, but found
the legislative history of the ADEA showed that it was enacted
under that provision.62
II. CIRCUIT COURTS FINDING THE ADEA VALIDLY ABROGATES
IMMUNITY
Several appellate courts that have considered the issue of
whether the ADEA validly abrogates state immunity have
determined that it, in fact, does. 63 This section of the Note will
focus on two decisions: Migneault v. Peck64 and Coger v. Board of
Regents of State of Tennessee.65
A. The Migneault Decision
The Migneault court followed the holding in Seminole Tribe
and applied the two-prong test.66 The court found that the first
prong of the test was satisfied based on Hurd v. Pittsburg State
University,67 an earlier Tenth Circuit case that held the ADEA
was a valid abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity
because it contained an unequivocal expression of intent.68 The
second prong of the test required the Tenth Circuit to reevaluate
its precedent in light of the recent Supreme Court decision, City
of Boerne v. Flores.69 In City of Boerne, the Court held that
Congress, by enacting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
62 The court stated that while it is important to be able to determine the power
under which the legislation is passed, the fact that Congress did not expressly
invoke section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment should not be regarded as fatal to
the abrogation of immunity. See Coger, 154 F.3d at 304. "As long as Congress
possesses the authority, whether it also has the specific intent to legislate pursuant
to that authority is irrelevant." Id. at 303 (citing Doe v. University of Illinois, 138
F.3d 653, 658-59 (7th Cir. 1998)).
63 See Migneault v. Peck, 158 F.3d 1131 (10th Cir. 1998); Coger, 154 F.3d at
299; Keeton v. University of Nev. Sys., 150 F.3d 1055 (9th Cir. 1998); Scott v.
University of Miss., 148 F.3d 493 (5th Cir. 1998); Goshtasby v. Board of Trustees,
141 F.3d 761 (7th Cir. 1998); Hurd v. Pittsburg State Univ., 109 F.3d 1540 (10th
Cir. 1997); Ramirez v. Puerto Rico Fire Serv., 715 F.2d 694 (1st Cir. 1983).
64 158 F.3d 1131 (10th Cir. 1998).
65 154 F.3d 296 (6th Cir. 1998).
66 See Migneault, 158 F.3d at 1135.
67 109 F.3d 1540 (10th Cir. 1997).
68 See Migneault, 158 F.3d at 1136 (citing Hurd, 109 F.3d at 1546).
69 591 U.S. 507, 520 (1997). In Migneault, the University asserted that City of
Boerne represented superseding Supreme Court authority. Consequently, the court
was compelled to leave the safe harbor of past precedent and reexamine whether
Congress exceeded its authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment in
enacting the ADEA. See Migneault, 158 F.3d at 1136-37.
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(RFRA), exceeded its authority under the Fourteenth
Amendment because the Act was not remedial in nature. 70 The
RFRA prohibited state and federal governments from
substantially burdening religious exercise, unless that action
was the least restrictive means of furthering a "compelling
government interest."71 The majority concluded that Congress's
enactment of the RFRA would have modified the scope of the
Free Exercise Clause, rather than merely enforcing it.72
The Tenth Circuit was able to distinguish City of Boerne
because the RFRA's legislative history lacked evidence of
widespread religious discrimination that would warrant such
sweeping legislation.73  In contrast, the ADEA's legislative
history contained a sufficient showing of age-based
discrimination.74  It seems, however, the Migneault court's
reliance on congressional findings that link the ADEA to Section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment may be tenuous.75 Other circuit
courts have also relied on congressional findings in holding that
the ADEA is within the ambit of the Fourteenth Amendment.76
The Migneault court also addressed a claim that the ADEA
was passed pursuant to the Commerce Clause.77 Some other
70 The Court explained that the legislative history of the Fourteenth
Amendment confirms that legislation passed under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment must be remedial in nature. See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520.
71 See id. at 515-16 ("RFRA prohibits '[glovernment' from 'substantially
burdenling]' a person's exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of
general applicability unless the government can demonstrate the burden'... is in
furtherance of a compelling governmental interest...' ").
72 See id. at 519 ("Legislation which alters the meaning of the Free Exercise
Clause cannot be said to be enforcing the Clause.").
73 See id. at 509 ("[The RFRA] is so out of proportion to [any] supposed remedial
or preventive object that it cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed to
prevent, unconstitutional behavior.").
74 In Migneault, the court distinguished the heavy-handed approach of the
RFRA, which required strict scrutiny review and encompassed laws of general
application, from the ADEA's direct and specific attack on ageism. See Migneault,
158 F.3d at 1137-38.
75 The court itself recognized this weakness by stating "[wie recognize the
legislative history does not provide specific or detailed evidence of discrimination."
Id. at 1138.
76 See Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 77 F.3d 690, 695 (3d Cir. 1996)
(stating that "virtually every court which has addressed the question has concluded
that the ADEA was validly enacted pursuant to Congress's power to enforce section
five of the Fourteenth Amendment").
77 See Migneault, 158 F.3d at 1136 n.3 (noting that the circuit court had
previously revisited an earlier decision, and found that Congress passed the ADEA
under Section 5 of the Eleventh Amendment and therefore abrogated sovereign
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circuits have found that the ADEA was enacted under Commerce
powers, and not under the Fourteenth Amendment. 78 These
courts placed unjustified reliance on the Supreme Court's
holding in EEOC v. Wyoming,79 in which a public employee who
was forced to retire brought a suit alleging a violation of the
ADEA.80 The Supreme Court had to rule on whether the ADEA
violated the Tenth Amendment.81 In holding that the ADEA did
not violate the Tenth Amendment, the Court stated that the
constitutionality of the ADEA could have its roots in the
Commerce Clause.8 2 Even if the ADEA had been enacted
pursuant to the Commerce Clause, however, that need not be the
exclusive authority to enact such legislation.83
In Migneault, the Tenth Circuit, finding no mention of the
Fourteenth Amendment in the text of the ADEA, turned to the
congressional record.84 In contrast to the RFRA considered in
City of Boerne, the court found that the reports of both the House
of Representatives85 and the Senate8 6 indicated that the nature
of the ADEA legislation was remedial. The reports posited that
the purpose of the ADEA amendment was to expand the
coverage of the act in order for additional employees to be
protected from age discrimination.87 Specifically, the reports
immunity).
78 See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 234 (1983) (noting that every federal
court that had considered the question found that the ADEA was a valid exercise of
congressional power, either under the Commerce Clause or under the Fourteenth
Amendment).
79 460 U.S. 226 (1983).
80 The Plaintiff alleged that mandatory retirement at age 55 was a violation of
the ADEA. See id. at 234-35.
81 The state asserted that a game warden was barred from bringing suit
because legislation such as the ADEA cannot impinge on traditional state functions
reserved by the Tenth Amendment. See id. at 236.
82 See id. at 243 ("The extension of the ADEA to cover state and local
governments, both on its face and as applied in this case, was a valid exercise of
Congress's powers under the Commerce Clause.").
83 See id. at 243 n.18; see also Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379
U.S. 241, 286 (1964) (Douglas, J., concurring) (stating that while Congress "used the
Commerce Clause to regulate racial segregation, it also used (and properly so) some
of its power under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment").
84 See Migneault v. Peck, 158 F.3d 1131, 1138 (10th Cir. 1998) (concluding that
the congressional findings and legislative history indicated that age discrimination
was a common practice in the work place).
85 See H.R. REP. No. 93-913 (1974).
86 See S. REP. No. 93-690 (1974).
87 See H.RL REP. No. 93-913, at 40-41; S. REP. No. 93-690, at 55-56.
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stated that the amendment would expand coverage of the ADEA
to include "Federal, State and local government employees." If a
state employee is to be protected from age discrimination in the
workplace, the employee must be able to bring an action against
the state. The reports concluded that the chief purpose of the
amendment was to afford the same protection for older workers
in federal, state, and local governments that the ADEA already
afforded those in private employment.88
Furthermore, the presidential message8 9 approving the
legislation was another indication that the ADEA was passed
pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment. 90 Legislation passed
under the Enabling Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment must
be remedial in nature.91 The ADEA satisfies this requirement by
containing within its findings and purpose section,92 the
statement that older persons are routinely discriminated against
because of arbitrary age limitations placed on employment
opportunities. 93 This reference alone may be sufficient to satisfy
the mandate that legislation passed under the Fourteenth
Amendment be remedial. The remedial nature of the ADEA,
however, is further evidenced by the limited scope of protection
granted by the statute94 -a scope indicative of a statute seeking
88 See H.R. REP. No. 93-913, at 40-41; S. REP. NO. 93-690, at 56.
89 The legislative history of the ADEA embodies remarks made by President
Nixon in 1972. See Ramirez v. Puerto Rico Fire Serv., 715 F.2d 694, 699 (1st Cir.
1983). In addition to adding the word "ageism" to the political lexicon, President
Nixon's comments defined age discrimination as an "evil" that would trigger the
application of equal protection:
Discrimination based on age-what some people call 'age-ism'--can be as
great an evil in our society as discrimination based on race or religion or
any other characteristic which ignores a person's unique status as an
individual and treats him or her as a member of some arbitrarily-defined
group .... [Dliscrimination based on age is cruel and self-defeating....
Id.
90 The strong presidential message embodied in the House of Representatives
and Senate Reports lends great insight to the problems that were facing older
employees. See H.R. REP. No. 93-913, at 40; S. REP. NO. 93-690, at 55.
91 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997).
92 See 29 U.S.C. § 621(a), (b) (1994).
93 "[Tihe setting of arbitrary age limits regardless of potential for job
performance has become a common practice, and certain otherwise desirable
practices may work to the disadvantage of older persons. . . ."Id. at § 621(a)(2).
94 The ADEA limits its protection to those employees that are at least 40 years
of age. See 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (1994). Furthermore, the statute recognizes that there
are situations in which age may be a bona fide qualification for employment. See 29
U.S.C. § 623(f) (1994).
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only to correct discrimination and not create substantive
rights.95 Unlike the statute at issue in City of Boerne v. Flores,96
the ADEA is less substantive and seeks only to provide redress
to those who have been discriminated against.97 It seems the
Tenth Circuit properly determined that the ADEA was remedial
in nature and thus within the scope of Enabling Clause
authority. While Congress may have passed the ADEA under
legislative powers associated with the Commerce Clause, the
legislation can likewise be justified under the Enabling Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Hence, the Tenth Circuit properly
held in Migneault that the defendant, a state university, could be
subject to an age discrimination suit under the ADEA.
B. The Coger Decision
The Sixth Circuit likewise found that the ADEA properly
abrogated state immunity.98 It explicitly found that "Congress
intended to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity
from suit by its enactment of the 1974 amendments to the
ADEA, and that it had the authority to do so pursuant to Section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment."99
The suit involved seventeen faculty members of Memphis
State University, who challenged the University's method of
giving raises to older faculty members. 00 The Sixth Circuit
began its analysis with the first prong of the Seminole Tribe
test-the requirement that intent to abrogate be "unmistakably
clear." 01 The University contended the ADEA's definition of
"employer," which specifically included states, fell short of
evincing an unmistakably clear intent to abrogate the state's
95 Clearly, the ADEA was passed to ensure that discrimination based on age
would no longer be seen as permissible. The Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment demands that non-suspect class groups be afforded
protection as well. See infra note 113 and accompanying text.
96 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
97 See supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
93 See Coger v. Board of Regents, 154 F.3d 296, 299 (6th Cir. 1998) (finding that
Congress unequivocally expressed its intention to abrogate the states' Eleventh
Amendment immunity in ADEA suits).
99 Id. at 307.
1o See id. at 299.
101 See id. at 301-02 (reaching a conclusion based on the Supreme Court's
treatment of the age-discrimination issue in the context of statutory schemes such
as the IGRA in Seminole Tribe).
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immunity.10 2 The circuit court agreed with the plaintiffs that the
ADEA amendments of 1974 showed an unmistakably clear
statement of intent to abrogate.10 3 As in Seminole Tribe,10 4 the
court felt that the same use of language implicating the state as
a defendant fulfilled the first prong.10 5
As for the second prong of Seminole Tribe, "whether
Congress has acted 'pursuant to a valid exercise of power,'"106
the Sixth Circuit held that the ADEA amendments were passed
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 10 7 The court
held that Seminole Tribe did not add a requirement that
Congress must intentionally pass legislation under a particular
power. 08 The court again placed reliance on the congressional
findings of the original enactment of the ADEA,10 9 determining
that the statute was intended to remedy the problem of age
102 See id. at 301. Moreover, the University relied on the proposition in
Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223 (1989), that the congressional intent must be made
with "perfect confidence." Id. at 231.
103 See Coger, 154 F.3d at 301-02 (holding that "Congress made its intent to
abrogate the states' immunity against ADEA suits eminently clear").
104 Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996). The statute at issue in
Seminole Tribe was the IGRA. The Court in Seminole Tribe found an improper
abrogation because the second prong of the two-prong test was not fulfilled. See
supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
105 In Seminole Tribe, the Court found "[any conceivable doubt as to the
identity of the defendant in an action under § 2710(d)(7)(A)(i) is dispelled when one
looks to the various provisions of § 2710(d)(7)(B), which describe the remedial
scheme available to a tribe that files suit [against a state]." Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S.
at 57. The Court concluded that "the numerous references to the 'State' in the text of
§2710(d)(7)(B) make it indubitable that Congress intended through the Act to
abrogate the States' sovereign immunity from suit." Id. Likewise, in examining
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989), the Sixth Circuit was persuaded
that the first prong could be fulfilled by a definition of "persons" covered by the
statute. Id. at 7. Under the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), the definition of "persons" includes
states. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1994); see also 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21) (1994) ("The
term 'persons' means... state...."). Furthermore, under 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(D)
(1994), states are treated in the same manner as non-governmental owner-
operators.
106 Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 55 (citations omitted).
107 See Coger v. Board of Regents, 154 F.3d 296, 307 (6th Cir. 1998).
108 See id. at 303 (considering Eleventh Amendment immunity with regard to
intent and the ADA).
109 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 621(a)-(b) (1994) (declaring the purpose of the statute is "to
prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment."); see also Hazen Paper Co. v.
Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993) (finding that Congress promulgated the ADEA
because of concern that "older workers were being deprived of employment on the
basis of inaccurate and stigmatizing stereotypes").
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discrimination.110 In addition, the court was not persuaded that
the failure to use the words "Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment" was fatal."'
An alternative argument asserted by the University was
that "the ADEA exceeds Congress's Section 5 enforcement
authority because age is not a suspect or quasi-suspect class."112
The court held, however, that the fact that age is not a suspect
classification does not eliminate the Equal Protection Clause as
a source of authorization for Congress to prohibit age-based
discrimination. 13
The University also argued that the ADEA is so expansive
that it creates new substantive rights exceeding congressional
authority as expressed by the Supreme Court in City of
Boerne. 1 4 The court held that the ADEA, unlike the RFRA,
contained the requisite "congruence and proportionality between
the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to
that end."115 To analyze the ADEA, the Sixth Circuit followed a
proportionality inquiry recently constructed by the Fifth
Circuit. 116 The court determined that the ADEA was clearly
proportional, because age discrimination was a problem detailed
in the legislative findings that accompanied the ADEA,117 and
the remedy sought in the legislation was not disproportionate to
the "evil."" 8 This court's analysis should have been instructive
110 See Coger, 154 F.3d at 304.
HI See id. (relying on EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 243-44 n.18 (1983))
(stating that Congress's failure to invoke a specific authority for its legislation is not
fatal).
112 Id. at 305.
113 See id.; see also City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S.
432, 439 (1985) (emphasizing that the Equal Protection Clause's general
requirement is that "all persons similarly situated should be treated alike").
114 See Coger v. Board of Regents, 154 F.3d 296, 305 (6th Cir. 1998). In City of
Boerne, the Supreme Court declared the Religious Freedom and Restoration Act
(RFRA) unconstitutional. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532 (1997)
(finding that the RFRA is overbroad and therefore unconstitutional).
115 City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520; see also Coger, 154 F.3d at 306-07.
116 See Coolbaugh v. Louisiana, 136 F.3d 430, 435 (5th Cir. 1998) ("This
proportionality inquiry has two primary facets: the extent of the threatened
constitutional violations, and the scope of the steps provided in the legislation to
remedy or prevent such violations.").
117 This is particularly evidenced by the Presidential message that was
delivered in 1972 by President Nixon. See supra note 89.
118 See Coger, 154 F.3d at 306-07. The Sixth Circuit found that "even after the
City of Boerne, the fact that some ADEA provisions may exceed constitutional
requirements does not render the statute so disproportionate to its purpose that it
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to the Supreme Court in its review of the Kimel decision. Other
circuit courts have used this traditionally accepted analysis to
reach similar conclusions about the ADEA. The Sixth Circuit,
searching only the ordinary meaning of the ADEA, was able to
find both prongs of the Seminole Tribe two-part test fulfilled.119
III. CIRCUIT COURTS FINDING THE ADEA DOES NOT VALIDLY
ABROGATE IMMUNITY
Other circuits have reached a contrary conclusion
concerning the ADEA. Specifically, the Eighth and Eleventh
Circuits have found that the Act does not abrogate states'
sovereign immunity.120 Their analysis, however, was flawed, in
that it failed to grant Congress the deference that it has been
traditionally granted by the judiciary.' 2 ' Furthermore, the logic
applied by these courts was, at best, tenuous.
A. The Humenansky Decision
In Humenansky v. Regents of the University of Minnesota,122
the Eighth Circuit held that the ADEA was not a proper
abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity. 23 The court
contrasted the amendments of the ADEA with the amendments
of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)124 and reached an
anomalous result. The court based its decision on what it
believed to be a failure to amend Section 626(c) of the ADEA
with the same specificity as the FLSA. 25 A strong dissent,
represents an invalid exercise of Congress's enforcement power." Id. at 307.
119 See id. at 301. For instance, the court reasoned "[w]hen Congress added the
states to the definition of 'employer,' it did so knowing that the ADEA provides that
an employer who violates the statute is liable for legal and equitable relief." Id.
120 See supra note 118-19.
121 See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966) (finding that Congress
must, in the first instance, "determin[e] whether and what legislation is needed to
secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment," and its conclusions are
entitled to much deference).
122 152 F.3d 822 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 930 (2000).
123 See id. at 828.
124 See id. at 825.
125 See id. The court reasoned that there were only two inferences that could be
drawn from Congress's failure to amend all sections of the ADEA. Either there was
no intent to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment or there was a failure on the part of
Congress to specifically abrogate state immunity. Disagreeing with other circuit
courts, the court stated that neither of these two inferences would allow a
conclusion that states' immunity had been abrogated. See id.
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however, cited the 1974 amendment to the ADEA, which
specifically allowed suits against the states.126 The dissent
argued that the language of the amendment was sufficient to
satisfy the congressional intent requirement set forth in
Seminole Tribe.127 In addition, the dissent stated that the second
prong'm of the Seminole Tribe test was fulfilled because
Congress enacted the ADEA pursuant to Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 129
The court held that the University of Minnesota was
immune under the Eleventh Amendment and that the ADEA
had not abrogated such immunity.130 The analysis began with
the first prong of the Seminole Tribe test,131 but analytically, the
court became entangled with what it termed a 'hybrid
enforcement mechanism."132 A "hybrid enforcement mechanism"
occurs when one section of a statute determines who may seek
redress under the statute and another section details the
enforcement of the statute through another statute. The ADEA
contains one section that authorizes suits under the statute and
another section that details enforcement by cross-referencing the
FLSA.133 The cross-referencing occurred between these two
statutes because they were legislated at the same time and the
enforcement provisions were only set out in the FLSA.
This cross-reference troubled the Eighth Circuit because an
earlier decision by the Supreme Court held that a cross-
referenced section did not display the sufficiently clear
congressional intent required to abrogate sovereign immunity.134
126 See id. at 829. The dissent argued that there are "direct textual references to
[the] 'state'.. . in the 1974 amendments." Id.
127 See id. The dissent cited Seminole Tribe and Dellmuth in finding that the
definitional change of "employer" to include the states clearly expressed Congress's
intent to abrogate state immunity. See id.
Ms See supra notes 44-63 and accompanying text.
w2 See Humenansky, 152 F.3d at 830. The dissent argued that the legislation
was validly passed under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment because the
ADEA was enacted to enforce equal protection. See id.
130 See id. at 824.
131 See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
132 Humenansky, 152 F.3d at 824.
133 See id. As the court noted, 29 U.S.C. §§ 626(b) and (c), provide relief
obtainable under the ADEA. Section 626(b) cross-references to an enforcement
statute, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), under the FLSA that also provides relief.
134 See Humenansky, 152 F.3d at 824-25; see also Employees v. Missouri Public
Health Dep't, 411 U.S. 279, 285 (1973) (stating that absent an express provision,
Congress may not take away a state's sovereign immunity and allow a citizen to sue
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Congress remedied the FLSA in 1974, by amending section
216(b) to allow suits against the states.135 Section 626(c) of the
ADEA, however, was not amended to allow suits against the
states. 36 The court concluded that since section 626(c) was not
amended, there could be no abrogation, despite the definitional
changes in the ADEA.137 Statutory interpretation, however,
leads to a different conclusion with regard to section 626(c).138 If
the section at issue is read in conjunction with section 630(b), the
definitional section, which the court seems to ignore, a wholly
different result may be achieved, since section 630(b) as
amended explicitly provides that a state may be an "employer"
under the Act.139 A convincing argument could be made that
based on the fact that the definitional section was changed, a
a state in federal court).
135 The Eighth Circuit found that this change in section 216(b) was sufficient to
meet the first prong of Seminole Tribe. See Humenansky, 152 F.3d at 825. Section
216(b) states that "[any employer who violates ... this title shall be liable to the
employee.... An action to recover the liability... may be maintained against any
employer (including a public agency) in any Federal or State court." 29 U.S.C. §
216(b) (1994).
13G See 29 U.S.C. § 626(c) (1994). The court's basic premise was that this section
only contains a general authorization to enforce the ADEA. See Humenansky, 152
F.3d at 825. The court specifically found, however, that some portion of the ADEA
was covered by the amendment to section 216(b). Therefore, there was proper
abrogation at least as it relates to section 626(b), which incorporates section 216(b).
See id. Section 626(c) reads as follows: "[amny person aggrieved may bring a civil
action in any court of competent jurisdiction for such legal or equitable relief as will
effectuate the purposes of this chapter." 29 U.S.C. § 626(c) (1994).
137 The court was persuasive in stating "[tihere are only two rational answers to
[the question why Congress failed to amend § 626(c)]-no intent to abrogate for the
ADEA, or legislative oversight, which is not a proper basis for finding umistakably
clear' intent to abrogate in the statute's text." Humenansky, 152 F.3d at 825.
138 Congress's failure to change this section may not be an oversight on its part.
Indeed, the general language coupled with the definitional changes in other sections
of the ADEA could lead to an interpretation sufficient to meet the first prong of
Seminole Tribe. See 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1994).
139 Thus, if a person is within the class of persons able to bring a suit against
the state, under section 630(b), seeking such suit in "any court of competent
jurisdiction," under section 626(c), is not inconsistent with the requirements of
Seminole Tribe. It is true that the word "any" may have unwanted vagueness, but
unmistakable authorization for suit is found in section 630(b) which states:
The term "employer" means a person engaged in an industry .... The
term also means (1) any agent of such a person, and (2) a State or political
subdivision of a State and any agency or instrumentality of a State or a
political subdivision of a State, and any interstate agency, but such term
does not include the United States, or a corporation wholly owned by the
Government of the United States.
29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1994).
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failure to change the applicability section is not fatal to the
ADEA as applied to state employers. Proper abrogation under
Seminole could be found if these sections are read together.
The Eighth Circuit also found that the ADEA failed to fulfill
the second prong of the Seminole Tribe analysis, 140 and was not
within the ambit of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.' 41
The plaintiffs argued the ADEA is "'plainly adapted' to enforcing
the Equal Protection Clause."42 However, the Eighth Circuit
was not persuaded by the cautionary language the Supreme
Court used in Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia143
that the problems of forced retirement are very serious and
require close examination.14 The Eighth Circuit stated that "it
seems likely that only a few isolated, egregiously irrational
instances of age discrimination would violate the Equal
Protection Clause."145 This is in stark contrast to the whole
notion of "ageism" and the congressional reports, including
section 630(b) of the ADEA.146 While it is true, as the court
states, that there may be legitimate reasons for discrimination
based on age,147  the ADEA would only permit such
discriminatory practices if the rational basis test was fulfilled.1'
The Eighth Circuit further posited that the Supreme Court
would not embrace an expansive view of congressional power
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 149 Analyzing
Chief Justice Burger's dissent in EEOC v. Wyoming,150 the
circuit court contended that the Constitution does not contain
140 See Humenansky, 152 F.3d at 826.
141 See id.
142 Id. (quoting Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966)).
143 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
144 See id. at 317 n.11.
145 Humenansky, 152 F.3d at 827.
146 The legislative history and the presidential message strongly indicate that
age discrimination is more than an occasional problem. See supra note 85-90 and
accompanying text.
147 See Humenansky, 152 F.3d at 827 n.4.
148 That is, the discriminatory practice must be rationally related to a
legitimate state interest. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 472 (1991) (finding
that under a rational basis test, the state's mandatory retirement was "a legitimate,
indeed compelling, interest in maintaining a judiciary fully capable of performing
the demanding tasks that judges must perform").
149 See Humenansky, 152 F.3d at 827.
150 460 U.S. 226, 251-65 (1983) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The majority in
Wyoming expressly declined to decide the issue of whether the ADEA was within
congressional powers of Section 5. See id. at 243.
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any protection for elderly people. 151 Thus, the court stated that
the ADEA "exceeds Congress's section 5 powers as defined in
City of Boerne."152 What the court, however, did not take into
account is that there are other Supreme Court precedents that
grant protection to non-suspect classes. In City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Center, Inc.,153  the Court declared an
exclusionary zoning law, prohibiting housing for the mentally
retarded, unconstitutional because it did not meet a rational
basis review.154 Likewise in Romer v. Evans,155 the Court held
that a state constitutional amendment, preventing the State of
Colorado or any of its cities from granting homosexuals certain
protections, was invalid under a rational basis review. In these
two cases, the persons that were seeking protection under the
Equal Protection Clause were not entitled to elevated protection
as a suspect or quasi-suspect class, yet were still afforded
protection under the rational basis standard.
The dissent argued that the ADEA fulfilled both prongs of
the Seminole Tribe decision. 156 Regarding the first prong, the
dissent found the 1974 amendments to the ADEA persuasive to
show Congress's intent to abrogate states' sovereign
immunity. 57 The dissent also found the second prong of the
analysis fulfilled by the ADEA.158 It argued that the ADEA
corrects constitutional violations, as illustrated by the
congressional announcement released with the statute159 and its
legislative history.160
151 See Humenansky, 152 F.3d at 827-28. The court interpreted the lack of
mention of age, and the amount of references to the state sovereign powers in the
Constitution, to find that age cannot be protected under the Constitution. See id.
152 Id. at 828. Recall that City of Boerne declared the Religious Freedom and
Restoration Act (RFRA) unconstitutional because it was "so out of proportion" to the
problems that it was seeking to correct. See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying
text.
153 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
154 The Court appeared to be applying the rational basis test with more vigor
than it had done previously, however, the inquiry was still framed under the
rational basis standard. See id. at 447-50.
155 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
156 See Humenansky, 152 F.3d at 828-31.
157 See id. at 829. Indeed, this is the place that other circuit courts have found
congressional intent. See Coger v. Board of Regents, 154 F.3d 296, 306-07 (6th Cir.
1998).
158 See Humenansky, 152 F.3d at 829-31.
159 See 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1994). The statute declared "the purpose of this chapter
[is] to promote employment of older persons based on their ability rather than age;
to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment; to help employers and
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Additionally, there is a clear distinction between the ADEA
and the RFRA. 161 Unlike the majority opinion that found the
ADEA similar to the RFRA, the dissent found more of a
similarity between the ADEA and the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA).162 The dissent cited a recent Eighth
Circuit decision that held the ADA to be valid legislation under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 163 The dissent drew
close analogies between the ADEA and the ADA, finding the
ADEA within congressional power. 64  This argument is
persuasive because the statutes that the dissent found analogous
both relate to physical characteristics of people. If a disability
can be found to be within the ambit of Equal Protection, so too
should age-a characteristic that likewise embodies certain
physical and mental limitations.
The Eighth Circuit found that the ADEA did not properly
abrogate immunity, and left the plaintiff without redress against
his employer. 65 As the dissent argued, the majority of the court
failed to grant sufficient deference to Congress. 66
B. The Circuit Court Kimel Decision
Like the Eighth Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit held in Kimel
v. State of Florida Board of Regents167 that the ADEA could not
pierce state immunity because of a failure on the part of
workers find ways of meeting problems arising from the impact of age on
employment." Id.
10 "[Tjhere is evidence that, like the corporate world, government managers
also create an environment where young is somehow better than old." See EEOC v.
Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 233 (1983) (quoting Senate Special Committee on Aging,
Improving the Age Discrimination Law, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., 14 (Comm. Print.
1973), Legislative History 259).
161 See Humenansky, 152 F.3d at 830.
162 See id. at 830-31. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
163 See Humenansky, 152 F.3d at 830-31. The dissent was referring to Autio v.
AFSCME Local 3139, 140 F.3d 802, 805 (8th Cir. 1998) (finding that "[ulnlike the
RFRA struck down in Flores, the ADA is 'plainly adapted' as a remedial measure
even though each individual violation of the ADA may not in and of itself be
unconstitutional").
164 See Humenansky, 152 F.3d at 831.
165 See id. at 826.
166 See id. at 828-31. It is for Congress in the first instance to "determin[e]
whether and what legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth
Amendment," and its conclusions are entitled to much deference. Katzenbach v.
Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966).
167 139 F.3d 1426 (11th Cir. 1998).
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Congress to fulfill the prongs of the Seminole Tribe test.168 The
Eleventh Circuit's decision is somewhat unlike the other circuit
decisions discussed in this Note because of the fracture in the
court's decision.169 This fracture was caused by Judge
Edmondson's finding that the ADEA failed the first prong of the
Seminole Tribe analysis, and Judge Cox's finding that the ADEA
was not a proper exercise of power under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, thus causing the ADEA to fail the
second prong of the Seminole Tribe analysis. 7 0 Together their
concurring and dissenting opinions, albeit on different grounds,
stated that the ADEA did not validly abrogate sovereign
immunity.171
The Eleventh Circuit's analysis by Judge Edmondson began
with a discussion of whether the ADEA contained unmistakable
legislative intent. 172 The court held that the ADEA did not
contain such intent, and therefore it need not reach the second
prong of the Seminole Tribe analysis. 173 Relying on Dellmuth v.
Muth,174 the court refused to "go beyond the text of the ADEA in
deciding whether it contains the requisite, unmistakably clear
statement of intent to abrogate."175 The court misinterpreted the
Supreme Court's precedent. The Dellmuth decision stated that
"[1]egislative history generally will be irrelevant" because if the
168 The court stated that it would not review whether the ADEA was properly
legislated under the Fourteenth Amendment, but would determine whether the
ADEA contained the requisite language to demonstrate that Congress intended to
abrogate immunity. See id. at 1430.
169 See id. at 1427.
170 See id. at 1433, 1444.
171 See id. at 1433.
172 See id. at 1428-33.
173 See id. at 1433 ("[Tlhe ADEA contains no unequivocally clear statement of
such intent."). In the dissent, the second prong of the Seminole Tribe test is
discussed at great length. See id. at 1436-45. Judge Edmondson stated that he did
not want to decide whether the ADEA was validly passed pursuant to the
Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 1430. Judge Edmondson posited three reasons
why the ADEA would not pass the second prong of the Seminole Tribe test: (1) the
ADEA had been held by the Supreme Court to be passed under one statute, and
therefore a court should be careful not to find it legislated under another
constitutional power, (2) the two statutes were passed together in the same bill
(ADEA and FLSA) therefore, it seems likely that Congress passed the statutes
under the same power, and Congress explicitly declared this power as Commerce for
the FLSA, and (3) age is a questionable ground for Congress to be legislating under
the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 1430 n.8.
174 491 U.S. 223 (1989).
175 Kimel, 139 F.3d at 1430.
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intent is clear in the language of the statute, "recourse to
legislative history will be unnecessary."176 If, however, the
language in the ADEA is not clear, then recourse to the
legislative history is instructive. The findings of both the House
and Senate contain very clear statements of the purpose of the
ADEA.177 The statement in Dellmuth should not have precluded
Judge Edmondson from looking to the legislative history.
Drawing a distinction between the ADEA and the IGRA,'78
the court found that the ADEA had language that was indeed
broader than the IGRA,179 thus shedding little light on whether a
suit could be brought by an individual against a state in federal
court.180 The general language of the statute, however, should
satisfy the court. The statute specifically provides that states
are employers for the purposes of the statute.18 '
The court was troubled that the statute required the
"fit[ting] together [of] various sections of the statute to create an
expression from which one might infer an intent to abrogate."182
Thus, in reading the various sections of the ADEA, the
abrogation never becomes "as clear as is the summer's sun."183
The court, however, missed the point. If an act is printed in
many separate sections of United States Code, the legislative
intent of the statute must necessarily be found in several
sections of the Code. Therefore, a court needs to piece together
portions of the Code to arrive at an interpretation of the
statute. 8 4
176 Dellmuth, 491 U.S. at 230.
177 See supra notes 84-90 and accompanying text (discussing the Tenth
Circuit's reliance on House and Senate Reports in determining that the ADEA is
within the scope of the Enabling Clause authority).
178 Recall this is the IGRA. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
179 Kimel, 139 F.3d at 1431 n.9.
1so See id.
181 See 29 U.S.C. § 630 (1994) (stating that "employer" means "a State or
political subdivision of a State.").
182 Kimel, 139 F.3d at 1431.
183 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, KING HENRY THE FIFTH act 1, sc. 2. The fact that
the court resorts to William Shakespeare in support of its rationale portrays the
court's zealousness. See Kimel, 139 F.3d at 1431 n.10. Shakespeare's statement was
made by Henry V as an excuse for his invasion of France, but it is questionable
whether Henry V believed it. It is unclear why, with the quantity of case law
handed down by the Supreme Court regarding the standard for abrogation, the
Eleventh Circuit would have to turn to Shakespeare to make its point.
184 For example, in the area of environmental law alone, the Federal Insecticide
and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-1364 (1994), the Endangered Species Act, 16
U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994), and the Air Pollution Prevention Control Act, 42 U.S.C.
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The court further attacked the ADEA by proving that there
was no "unequivocal expression" in the statute. 85 In Dellmuth,
the Supreme Court suggested that a statute may eliminate
sovereign immunity "without explicit reference to state sovereign
immunity or the Eleventh Amendment." 18 6 Thus, it seems the
Eleventh Circuit interpreted Dellmuth too narrowly.
A citizen may have other remedies against a state besides a
private suit. For instance, in Seminole Tribe, the Supreme Court
stated that the federal government could sue a state in federal
court and that an individual could sue a state officer in order to
ensure that the officer's conduct complies with federal law. 8 7
The Eleventh Circuit posited that a possible congressional intent
for the 1974 amendments to the ADEA was to authorize such
alternative remedies. 188 This argument is not cogent. The cases
that Seminole Tribe cites, namely Ex Parte Young 89 and United
States v. Texas,190 would apply to the ADEA without any
congressional amendment to the statute at issue. 191 By this
reasoning, Congress's only purpose for amending the ADEA
would have been to enable private age discrimination suits
against states.
In contrast, the court found that the ADA contained
language sufficient to meet the two-prong Seminole Tribe test.192
The court concluded that the express language of the ADA
satisfied the first prong of Seminole Tribe. 98 The statute's
explicit reference to the constitutional power being exercised by
Congress, though not dispositive, was a heavily weighted factor
in the court's decision.
§§ 7401-7671 (1994) each contain multiple sections that when read together seem to
give the full interpretation of the law.
185 Kimel, 139 F.3d at 1430.
186 Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 233 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring).
187 See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 71 n.14 (1996).
188 See Kimel, 139 F.3d at 1432.
189 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
190 143 U.S. 621 (1892).
191 Indeed, this is part of the argument that the Court advanced in Seminole
Tribe. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 71.
192 See Kimel, 139 F.3d at 1433.
193 See id. The court found the words "[a] State shall not be immune under the
eleventh amendment," under the statute met its standard of "unmistakably clear"
intent. See Kimel, 139 F.3d at 1433. The court then noted that these "magic words"
were not necessary. See id. at 1433 n.15.
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C. The Circuit Court Kimel Dissent
In his dissent, Chief Judge Hatchett argued that both the
ADEA and ADA validly abrogate states' sovereign immunity.194
The Chief Judge argued that "[a]lthough Judge Edmondson
state[d] that [the court does] not require Congress to use any
'magic words'... his opinion... requir[ed] exactly that."195
Noting that several circuits have found the definitional change
in the ADEA sufficient, the Chief Judge argued that "[tihe Court
in Seminole Tribe did not require that Congress use any
talismanic language to express its intent to abrogate, and could
easily have done so." 196 Notably, the Supreme Court has found
definitional changes, similar to that in the ADEA, to be sufficient
in the past.197 The dissent thus reasoned that the first prong of
Seminole Tribe was fulfilled.
The second part of the Chief Judge's analysis focused on
Judge Cox's reliance on City of Boerne.198 The Chief Judge
argued that Judge Cox wrongly interpreted the City of Boerne
holding, thus unconstitutionally limiting Congress.199  The
ADEA is unlike the RFRA, because it does not profess to
legislate a judicial standard of review.200 The ADEA is designed
to protect elderly workers, a class that ought to be free from
arbitrary or irrational discrimination. It is not a statute that
mandates a standard of judicial review.201 The Chief Judge
further argued that the ADEA can protect elderly workers even
though the Supreme Court has not yet declared that
constitutional violations have occurred.20 2  This conclusion
194 See id. at 1434 (Hatchett, C.J., dissenting).
195 Id. at 1435.
190 Id.
197 See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 464-67 (1991) (stating that
Congress intended to include states as employers in amending the ADEA);
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 452 (1976) (stating that since Congress
designated states as parties, it intended to abrogate the states' immunity).
193 See Kimel, 139 F.3d at 1436.
199 See id. at 1437.
200 See id. In the RFRA, Congress included language that "prohibit[ed]
'Ig]overnment' from 'substantially burden[ing]' a person's exercise of religion even if
the burden result[ed] from a rule of general applicability unless the government
[could] demonstrate the burden '(1) [was] in furtherance of a compelling
governmental interest; and (2) [was] the least restrictive means of furthering that
compelling governmental interest.' "Id. at 1436 n.7 (alteration in original) (quoting
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (1994)).
201 See Kimel, 139 F.3d at 1437.
202 See id. at 1438.
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emerges from the rational-basis standard because it "reflect[s]
the Court's awareness that the drawing of lines that create
distinctions is peculiarly a legislative task and an unavoidable
one."203 The dissent found the ADEA within the "wide latitude"
of deference that should be given to Congress. 20 4
Moreover, the dissent argued that "[tihe ADEA is an
appropriate, proportional remedial measure to address age
discrimination."2°5 The most recent standard used to determine
this part of the second prong is whether there is "a congruence
and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or
remedied and the means adopted to that end."206 Facially, the
ADEA contains findings of acts of age discrimination that have
occurred.20 7 The statute itself contains a provision allowing age
discrimination when justified by job classification. 208 This is
further evidence that the statute itself is proportional to the
perceived issue of age discrimination and within the standards of
the second prong of Seminole Tribe. The Chief Judge would have
found that both the ADEA and ADA validly abrogate state
immunity under the Fourteenth Amendment.209
Judge Cox filed a third opinion in which he concurred in
part and dissented in part.210 He wrote that Congress lacked the
constitutional authority to abrogate the states' Eleventh
Amendment immunity from suit under both the ADEA and the
203 Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314 (1976). On a
practical basis, if legislation such as the ADEA were found invalid, the legislative
process would be stifled. Congress could not pass any legislation pursuant to the
Enabling Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the clause would have no real
meaning.
204 See Kimel, 139 F.3d at 1438; see also City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507,
519-20 (1997) (stating that with regard to abrogation Congress should be given
"wide latitude").
205 Kimel, 139 F.3d at 1439.
206 City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520.
207 See 29 U.S.C. § 621 (1994) (stating that discrimination had become a
"common practice" that was unrelated to legitimate employment goals). In addition,
the floor debate discussions in the years preceding 1974 are instructive. See 110
CONG. REC. 2596-99, 9911-13, 13490-92 (1964); 118 CONG. REC. 7745 (1972). The
legislative history from 1974 is somewhat scant but there is reference to earlier
history. See supra notes 85-90 and accompanying text.
208 See 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1994). Employers can defend their employment
decisions on the ground that there are "bona fide occupational qualification[s]
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the particular business." Id.
209 See Kimel, 139 F.3d at 1444.
210 See id.
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ADA.2s 1 The Judge did not want to decide the "thorny issue of
Congress's intent" because of the "recently revisited... limits on
[Fourteenth Amendment congressional] power."21 2 Thus, Judge
Cox maintained, neither the ADEA nor the ADA fulfilled the
second prong of Seminole Tribe.213 Citing City of Boerne, Judge
Cox argued that "legislation enacted pursuant to § 5 must hew to
the contours of Supreme Court-defined Fourteenth Amendment
rights unless the legislation is a proportional response to a
documented pattern of constitutional violation."214
Finding that the ADEA was not a proper exercise of
Congress's Enabling Clause powers, it seems Judge Cox properly
analyzed the statute by determining whether the conduct could
be regulated under the Fourteenth Amendment. Determining
that age discrimination by government could be regulated under
the Fourteenth Amendment, Judge Cox applied a rational-basis
standard.215 Most legislation will pass this low level of scrutiny,
but if the varying treatment of persons is sufficiently "unrelated
to the achievement of any... legitimate purposes" the action
will be found to be a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.216
The Supreme Court has found that age discrimination is not
a violation of the rational-basis standard on three separate
occasions. 217 In other contexts, however, the arbitrary firing of
persons solely based on age would likely lack a rational basis.
Judge Cox made light of this by stating "[t]o the spry
octogenarian.., a mandatory retirement age is arbitrary."218 It
is this precise notion that justifies protection of the elderly via
the Fourteenth Amendment. Judge Cox further argued that the
ADEA was not enforcement legislation. He asserted that the
ADEA subjected age discrimination to a more rigorous test than
the rational-basis test, which is normally applied to violations of
the Equal Protection Clause that do not involve a suspect
211 See id.
212 Id. at 1445.
213 See id.
214 Id. at 1446.
215 See id. at 1447; see also Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 470 (1991);
Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1976).
216 Gregory, 501 U.S. at 471.
217 See id. at 473 (upholding mandatory retirement ofjudges at age 70); Vance
v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 94-95 (1979) (finding a policy requiring officers to retire at
age 50 to meet the rational basis standard); Murgia, 427 U.S. at 316-17 (holding
policy that requires police officers to retire at age 60 constitutional).
218 Kimel, 139 F.3d at 1447.
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class.219 Those who have been fortunate to become advanced in
years may not have the dexterity required for employment in the
police force or judiciary.220 If such persons, however, do possess
the necessary skills for their jobs even as they age, they should
not be discriminated against solely because they are old.221 The
Fourteenth Amendment, therefore, should protect the rights of
such persons from curtailment by the States.
IV. THE SUPREME COURT DECIDES KIMEL
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the Kimel
decision.222 Many scholars and spectators of the Court closely
followed this case.223 In its last Term, the Supreme Court heard
a trio of cases that were closely related to the Kimel decision,224
and held that the states were immune from suit under several
statutes.225 These decisions underscore the Court's reluctance to
abrogate states' sovereign immunity. More fundamentally, this
219 See id. at 1448.
220 One could argue that police officers and judges are both professions that
require physical strength. A police officer can be called upon to use physical
strength to apprehend a criminal. To a lesser extent, a member of the judiciary is
called upon to use physical strength in sitting long hours on the bench. This Note
posits that there is an element of physical strength in both jobs and the jobs should
not be treated differently by the courts.
221 Whether the term "age as a proxy," as stated in Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins,
507 U.S. 604, 611 (1993), is used or not, the firing of an older employee without
regard to his or her skills is discrimination based on age.
222 See Kimel v. State of Fla. Bd. of Regents, 525 U.S. 1121 (1999).
223 See Joan Biskupic, State Age-Bias Liability At Issue Before Justices: Case
May Have Wide Civil Rights Impact, WASH. POST, Oct. 14, 1999, at A2 (noting the
wide-ranging impact of the upcoming Kimel decision); Jan Crawford Greenburg,
Federal vs. State Power at Crux of Bias Case, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 13, 1999, at 4
(discussing the importance of the Kimel decision on the balance between federal and
state power); Linda Greenhouse, Age Bias Case in Supreme Court Opens a New
Round on Federalism, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 1999, at A25 (discussing oral argument
in the Kimel case and its possible outcome).
224 See Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2246 (1999) (holding that Maine could
not be sued by probation officers seeking redress in federal or state court); Florida
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 119 S. Ct. 2199,
2202 (1999) (stating that Congress exceeded its constitutional authority when it
authorized private suits against the states for patent infringement and Lanham Act
violations); College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.,
119 S. Ct. 2219, 2233 (1999) (same).
225 Notably, the Court held that the Patent and Lanham Acts did not validly
abrogate sovereign immunity. See Florida Prepaid, 119 S. Ct. at 2202; College Say.
Bank, 119 S. Ct. at 2233.
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Note advances the theory that the Supreme Court will continue
to narrow the ability of Congress to legislate pursuant to the
Enabling Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
This trend began with the Seminole Tribe decision that was
handed down in 1996.226 In Seminole Tribe, the Court overruled
an earlier case that allowed abrogation of state immunity under
the Commerce Clause, thereby limiting Congress to passing
abrogating legislation under the Fourteenth Amendment.227
Just one year later, in City of Boerne v. Flores,228 the Court held
it is the ultimate authority on the scope of Fourteenth
Amendment rights.229 Last Term, Chief Justice Rehnquist
furthered the Court's initiative toward a higher standard of
judicial review in Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education
Expense Board v. College Saving Bank. 23
In Florida Prepaid, the Court found the Patent and Plant
Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act (PRA) did not
validly abrogate state immunity231 because it failed the second
prong of the Seminole Tribe test.232 The Court held that there
was not enough of a substantial showing of the states' prior
infringement of patents to demonstrate that the Act was
"remedial" in nature.233 A review of the Act's legislative history
did not disclose sufficient findings to satisfy the Court.234
Importantly, the Court seemed to again raise the bar with
regard to the proper finding of abrogation under Seminole Tribe
and City of Boerne.25
2 See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 75-76 (1996).
See id. at 65-66 (overruling Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1
(1989)).
22 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
See id. at 524, 536.
230 See Florida Prepaid, 119 S. Ct. at 2199.
231 See id. at 2202.
232 See id. at 2207-11 (discussing possible avenues for upholding the Patent
Act, but ultimately concluding that the Act fails the test).
3 See id. 2207-08. "[Tlhe record at best offers scant support for Congress's
conclusion that States were depriving patent owners of property without due
process of law by pleading sovereign immunity in federal-court patent actions." Id.
at 2210.
234 In fact, the Court cites the legislative records within its opinion. See id. at
2207. In particular, the House Subcommittee Report expressly acknowledges that
there is no problem with patent infringement by states. See id. There are, however,
at least eight instances of patent infringement by states within the past one
hundred years. See id.
= See id. at 2210-11.
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The Court's recent position has continued in the current
Term. The Kimel decision has proven the Court's reluctance to
find legislation to properly abrogate state sovereign immunity
under the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice O'Connor, writing
for the majority, has led the Court in such a direction through
Kimel by simply applying existing precedent. 2 6 The Court did
not expressly set a more stringent standard for Fourteenth
Amendment legislation that abrogates state immunity.2 7 The
Court held that the ADEA is not valid legislation because it
lacks sufficient congruence and proportionality required under
the second prong of the Seminole Tribe analysis.238 The Court
did not create a new precedent by requiring "magic words."239
Future circuit court decisions will be guided by this Supreme
Court decision. Unfortunately, the Court continued its assault
on citizens' rights to sue states, by finding that the ADEA was
unconstitutional. This is a continuation of the Court's tendency
to limit the legislation that Congress may pass.
Due to the Court's finding that the ADEA is
unconstitutional, a public employee cannot bring an action
against their state employer for discrimination. In light of its
holding regarding the ADEA, the Court can venture forth and
attempt to nullify other statutes that abrogate sovereign
immunity. Perhaps, the Court will find portions of the Civil
Rights Act unconstitutional hicause they are not remedial.240
The deprivation of a person's civil rights is egregious and
236 This involves applying the Seminole Tfibe two-prong test in light of City of
Boerne and Florida Prepaid. Justice O'Connor noted that' 'Congress may abrogate
the States' constitutionally secured immunity from suit in federal court only by
making its intention unmistakably clear in the language of the statute,'" and that
such statute must have congruence and proportionality between the injury to be
prevented and the statutory remediation. Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 120 S. Ct.
631, 640 (2000) (quoting Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 228 (1989)).
237 The Court recognized its own reapplication of the test to determine whether
legislation validly abrogates sovereign immunity. In the preceding Term, the Court
considered whether the Patent Remedy Act was valid legislation by using the same
test. See id. at 649.
238 See id.
239 See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
240 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). This statute allows a private suit for damages
to be brought against any person who, "under color of any statute" or other law,
deprives the plaintiff of "any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws." This provision is one of the best known federal protections
for individuals, often used to bring suit against state and local officials who violate
individuals' civil rights. The constitutional basis for this statute is the Enabling
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id.
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requires protection. Section 1983 clearly provides very general
protection.241  The Court may determine that such broad
protections are beyond the remedial scope of Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment. It would not be inconceivable for the
Court to conclude that the Civil Rights Act is not remedial in
purpose and that it fails the second prong of the Seminole Tribe
analysis. Thus, it is arguable that the Court could find Section
1983 unconstitutional. This type of action would cause great
problems for the United States. Hopefully, the Court will not
take such action but it is not inconceivable given the current
trend.
CONCLUSION
Congress may legislate pursuant to the Enabling Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment to effectively abrogate state
immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. This Note supports
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act as a valid exercise of
congressional power under the Enabling Clause. Although some
circuits have found that the ADEA is a valid exercise of power
under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court has
determined that the Eleventh Circuit was correct in their
decision of the Kimel case. Thus, the Supreme Court has
demonstrated that the current Term has not departed from a
course that will strike down congressional legislation that
infringes on state immunity.
Due to the pervasiveness of age discrimination in the
workplace, it seems desirable to have Congress pass legislation
such as the ADEA to protect state workers and remedy past
discriminatory practices. The United States has a tripartite
system of government, with powers precariously balanced among
the three branches. Should the Court continue to strike down
statutes that abrogate state immunity, this balance may be
irreparably shifted in a way that will harm persons, which
Congress attempts to protect by way of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
241 The use of the word "any" implies broad protection. See id.
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